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IN PURSUIT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE PEER
EVALUATION PRIVILEGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Faculty peer evaluation committees are charged with assessing
applicants for tenured positions. Peer evaluations are necessary be-
cause they allow the universities of this country to create and main-
tain their standards of academic excellence.' Courts are compelling
these committees to reveal their findings in a number of discrimina-
tion suits brought by those recently denied tenure.2 This comment
argues that it is inappropriate for the courts to compel the disclosure
of the discussions and findings of these peer review committees
through discovery.
Tenure is awarded to professors upon completion of a trial pe-
riod and protects them from dismissal without cause.' Tenured em-
ployment can be terminated "only for adequate cause except in the
case of retirement for age or under extraordinary circumstances be-
cause of financial exigencies." 4
The award of tenure is granted through a variety of mecha-
nisms, depending upon the particular university.5 The tenure review
© 1988 by Kimberly S. Paul
1. See Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
see also McKillop v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
In McKillop, the court noted that the peer evaluation system at the University of California
produced one of the finest schools in the country and certainly the finest state university sys-
tem. Id. at 1275.
2. See generally Mobilia, Academic Freedom Privilege: A Sword or a Shield?, 9 VT. L.
REV. 43 (1984). This article discusses the federal court's failure to grant an evidentiary privi-
lege to peer evaluation committees where a civil rights violation is at issue. Although the au-
thor fails to propose a solution, she is squarely in favor of the use of privilege in this area. The
author concludes freedom of thought and discussion are integral parts of academic scholarship
and thus are fundamental to the very essence of the university function. It is primarily in this
capacity that courts have chosen to identify an academic privilege in context of constitutional
freedom. Id. at 67.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (5th ed. 1979).
4. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 37 (1969). [hereinafter AAUP].
5. King v. Regents of Univ. of California, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189 Cal. Rptr. 189
(1982). The University of California's procedure is typical. This system makes available four
ranks: 1) instructor; 2) assistant professor; 3) associate professor; and 4) professor. Only the
positions of associate and full professor are subject to tenure. The majority of assistant profes-
sors will undergo review for a tenured position at some point in their career. Id. at 814, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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process involves evaluation on many levels.' If the candidate's re-
quest for tenure is denied, the candidate may request a summary of
his or her review file and the reasons for the decision."
Tenure decisions are, in part, subjective evaluations based on
academic excellence.8 It is difficult to shape objective guidelines in
this area. The committee considers the quality of the candidate's
teaching, research and scholarship in the area of his or her spe-
cialty." Excellence, as opposed to competency, is the requirement.10
Each committee member has his or her own standards of excellence.
The discussion and debate concerning these standards and their ap-
plication are crucial to the decision-making process." The expres-
sion of opinions concerning personal standards and the application of
these standards to the work of a colleague is more likely to be candid
where confidentiality prevails.
Therefore, in order for peer evaluations to be effective, their
contents must be kept confidential.1 2 However, the countervailing
rights of those under review must also be considered. The confidenti-
ality interest of the university is in direct conflict with the interests of
those seeking the discovery of peer evaluations in an effort to prove
the university's discrimination.'" The questions which these suits
pose are difficult to answer given the competing interests at stake.
6. Numerous parties are involved in the appraisal process. Among those called upon are:
other faculty members of the department involved; outside experts in the candidate's field; the
department chair; the appropriate dean; an ad hoc review committee; a standing personnel
committee of the academic senate; and the chancellor's office. Id.
7. In addition, the candidate may respond to the decision and appeal to a standing com-
mittee on privilege and tenure. That committee will hold a hearing to determine the existence
of any procedural errors. Upon completion of the hearing, the committee will submit its rec-
ommendations to the chancellor. Id. at 815, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
8. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.
1978).
9. King, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
10. The King court, in denying appellant's claim of stigma, explained:
Appellant was not adjudged incompetent in any respect. The decision in ques-
tion was based on the considered opinion of scholars in each of the various areas
of review that his research work did not meet the stringent standard of excel-
lence required to achieve tenure. Failure to achieve unanimous praise as excel-
lent does not equate with being judged incompetent.
Id.
11. McKillop, 386 F. Supp. at 1277. In McKillop, the court refused to support plain-
tiff's contention that disclosure of the material sought would pose merely an insubstantial
threat to the operation of the peer evaluation system. Id.
12. Id.
13. Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
PEER EVALUATION
This country seeks to foster the free and uninhibited discovery
of all evidence."' However, disclosure is but one interest requiring
protection. Society also believes that certain relationships and com-
munications should be encouraged and nurtured. 5 Rules of privilege
have been designed in an effort to protect these relationships and
communications. 6 Further, privileged communications are beyond
the reach of discovery.1 7 Protection of these fundamental relation-
ships justifies any restriction on the search for truth.
The universal tensions of privilege law are ever present in the
context of peer evaluation. On the one hand, there is the need for
confidentiality in the peer context, evaluating system, but on the
other hand there is the need for the free flow of information which
aids a plaintiff in proving his case. In California, courts have consist-
ently refused to create an "academic privilege" to protect the confi-
dentiality of peer evaluation procedures. California courts prefer to
evaluate each situation by an ad hoc balancing of the immediate in-
terests in question.1 8
This comment analyzes these competing interests and how the
balancing approach applied by the courts tries to protect each inter-
est. It looks at the flaws inherent in that balancing approach and
proposes an absolute communication privilege protecting peer review
evaluations.
The background provides the description of the problem, dis-
cussing the competing interests which the courts must identify and
reconcile. The comment next analyzes the inconsistent state of the
law in California, identifying the flaws with a view toward reform.
Finally, the proposal suggests an absolute communication privilege
as a viable solution to the problem.
14. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982). The court discussed the importance of truth to the justice system. The court
believed that the search for truth should be free from impediments. Id. at 427-28.
15. C. MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE 171, § 72 (1984). Current relationships which are
considered privileged include: 1) attorney-client; 2) husband-wife; 3) psychotherapist-patient;
and 4) clergyman-communicant. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 428. Although the Dinnan court recognized the impor-
tance of the search for truth, it also recognized the societal importance of privilege. The opin-
ion contains a favorable discussion of the history of privilege and its traditional forms. Id.
18. See Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (Dong), 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (1981).
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II. BACKGROUND
California courts refuse to create a rule of privilege which will
effectively protect the confidentiality interests of universitys' peer
evaluation system. This refusal is based on the understandable fail-
ure to reconcile two equally important interests: academic freedom
and equality for all people.
A. Types of Privileges
A topic privilege protects information.19 It reflects the recogni-
tion that certain information warrants complete protection against
disclosure. A communication privilege prevents disclosure within cer-
tain relationships. 0 A topic privilege protects certain information re-
gardless of the existence of a protected relationship. A communica-
tion privilege protects all information within a protected relationship,
regardless of its content.
A privilege will either be qualified or absolute. A qualified priv-
ilege may apply to topic or communication privileges. A qualified
privilege against disclosure merely creates a rebuttable presumption
which may be overcome by an overwhelming need for the requested
information. 2 An absolute privilege protects the information or rela-
tionship regardless of counterbalancing needs.
In the peer evaluation context, courts have chosen to evaluate
the interests involved in a particular situation rather than apply
privilege.22 Only if the plaintiff's need for discovery outweighs the
injury caused by disclosure will the court grant full discovery."
B. Denial of Tenure and the Violation of Due Process
Denial of tenure does not result in the loss of a property or
liberty interest.24 Absent such a loss, plaintiffs are unable to show a
due process violation. 5 Therefore, when a professor is denied tenure,
19. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2210 (McNaughten rev.
1961).
20. Id. at 149.
21. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974).
22. Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1347. In Lynn, the court held: "When determining whether ten-
ure review files, including peer evaluations, are privileged, courts have balanced the univer-
sity's interest in confidentiality, and the need which Title VII plaintiffs have for obtaining peer
evaluations in their efforts to prove discriminatory conduct." Id.
23. See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., City of New York, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.
1982).
24. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
25. Id. at 571.
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on grounds other than discrimination, he or she is not afforded the
same protections as those who have been denied due process.26
A number of California and United States Supreme Court cases
continue to hold that, absent a contract right, there can be no denial
of due process. For example, in Board of Regents v. Roth,' 7 the
United States Supreme Court held that a non-tenured teacher pos-
sessed no liberty or property interest in reappointment other than
those considerations made by contract or state law."8
The Roth Court held that in order to invoke a property interest
in a benefit, a person must show more than an abstract need or de-
sire for it. 9 A property interest is created by independent sources,
such as a contract or a state law.8" The Court noted that respondent
had a right only to a one year position as specified by the employ-
ment contract, 1 and suggested that absent damage to respondent's
reputation and good name, no liberty interest was violated."
In Grant v. Adams," the California Court of Appeal found a
demotion from the position of principal to the position of classroom
teacher devoid of either a property or a liberty interest and therefore
found no violation of due process. 4
26. Id.; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Grant v. Adams, 69 Cal. App. 3d
127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1977); Council of Directors and Supervisors v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist., 35 Cal. App. 3d 147, 110 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1973); Hentschke v. Sink, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 19, 109 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1973).
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
28. Id. at 578. In Roth, the petitioner was hired by Wisconsin State University for a
contract term of one year. At the completion of that period, petitioner was not invited to return
for the following academic year. There was no stipulation in the employment contract which
entitled petitioner to any additional employment contracts. Id. at 566.
29. Id. at 578. The Court concluded: "In these circumstances, the respondent surely had
an abstract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to
require University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract
of employment." Id. at 578.
30. Id. at 577. The Court stated that property interests were not created by the Consti-
tution or unilateral expectations. Property interests are created and defined by existing rules
that support a claim of entitlement. Id.
31. Id. at 578.
32. Id. at 573. The Court stated: "It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a
person is deprived of liberty when he is simply not rehired in one job but remains as free as
before to seek another." Id. at 575 (citing Cafeteria and Restaurant Worker v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961)).
33. 69 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1977).
34. Id. at 130-31, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 836. Appellant began his employment with the
Jefferson Elementary School District of San Mateo County as vice principal for the school
year 1966-67. He served as principal from 1967-74. On March 1, 1974 appellant was notified
that he may not be reemployed in the position of principal for the succeeding year. In May, he
was informed that he would be transferred to a teaching position. The school district cited
financial conditions and administrative restructuring as its principle reasons for the transfer.
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In Perry v. Sinderman, the United States Supreme Court
held that even ten years of consecutive one year teaching contracts
could not create a constitutionally protected property right." How-
ever, the Court did suggest that lack of tenurial or contract rights,
taken alone, would not defeat a due process claim. 7 However, in
order to create the requisite property or liberty interest, the respon-
dent must prove a binding understanding between the parties. 8 The
Court, in defining "binding understanding" relied upon the princi-
ples of contract law.89 Before tenure is granted, a binding under-
standing that a contract will be automatically renewed does not exist.
Where there is a mere denial of tenure or a failure to renew a
contract, plaintiffs may not assume deprivation of property or liberty
interests. A property interest is created from an independent source
and will not be presumed. A liberty interest is created only where
the plaintiff's good name and reputation have been marred by the
decision not to retain the individual in a particular position.
C. Proof of Discrimination
Where a property or liberty interest has been interfered with,
the courts must consider whether due process has been violated. Due
process, as guaranteed by the Constitution, provides the plaintiff the
highest standards of protection.40 Free and open discovery is neces-
sary to afford plaintiff every opportunity to prove his or her denial
of due process. However, the courts have ruled that tenure is not a
protected property right."' The denial of due process is never at issue
in these cases and therefore, absent other compelling interests, there
is little need to protect the free flow of discovery.
However, where discrimination is alleged as the reason for de-
Id.
35. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
36. Id. The respondent taught in a state college system for ten years. Each year his one
year contracts were consecutively renewed. However, at the end of ten years the college failed
to renew respondent's contract. Id. at 594-95.
37. Id. at 599.
38. d. at 602.
39. Id. at 601. The Court stated that agreements not in writing could be implied, but
such implications should be viewed "in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. at 602.
Both the promisor's words and conduct are given definition by "relating them to the usage of
the past." Id. The Court, in applying these principles, held that a binding understanding is
more than a subjective expectancy, it is a claim supported by "the policies and practices of the
university." Id. at 603.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
41. See Perry, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Grant, 69 Cal. App. 3d
127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1977).
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nial of tenure, a violation of serious constitutional and statutory
principles is at issue.42 The United States has sought to encourage
access to the courts in order to vindicate claims of discrimination.43
These efforts were aided by The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII) which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, color, race,
national origin or religion in any federally funded program.44 In
1972, The Equal Opportunity Act amended Title VII by removing
the educational institution exemption.4" As a result, any plaintiff fil-
ing a discrimination claim against a university merits the heightened
protections afforded litigants under Title VII.
Due to the important societal interest in unmasking decisions
that are a pretext for discrimination, the courts have a heightened
interest in discerning the truth behind such allegations. Discovery
was designed to facilitate the search for truth.4' Therefore, where
discrimination is alleged, courts have a heightened interest in the free
flow of discovery. Privilege must not be used as a shield behind
which discrimination may grow and flourish.4
D. Academic Freedom
The very structure of academic life is rooted in the tenure sys-
tem. Choosing qualified professors is essential to maintaining the ex-
pected high standards of education. "[T]he peer review system has
evolved as the most reliable method for assuring promotion of the
candidates best qualified to serve the needs of the institution. '48 Ab-
sent a free system, the university is paralyzed in its decision making
process. The failure to institute a "communication privilege" protect-
ing the deliberations of peer review boards has been met with criti-
cism by the academic community. 49 Absent such protections, these
peer review discussions become stifled. The fear that statements
made within the private setting of an evaluation committee may,
someday, become public knowledge could silence dissent. The courts
continued failure to create a "communication privilege" is inconsis-
42. U.S. CONST. amends., XIV, § 1, Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
43. Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 431.
44. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
45. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, section 3,
86 Stat.103, 103-04 (1972).
46. Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 427.
47. Id. at 431.
48. Johnson, 435 F. Supp. at 1346.
49. See Mobilia, supra note 2, at 66.
1988]
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tent with their historical desire to extend to academia the freedoms
necessary to freely pursue excellence.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,5" the United States Supreme
Court derived academic freedom from the Constitutional protections
of freedom of association and expression as protected by the Bill of
Rights.6 The Court held that it was unnecessary for a professor at
the University of New Hampshire to answer certain questions put to
him by a committee investigating subversive activities.5 2 In addition,
the Court refused to compel any answers concerning the contents of
the professor's academic lecture.5"
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence set out four freedoms which
he believed were essential to the growth of the academic community.
He found it imperative that the university be free to determine for
itself: 1) who may teach; 2) what may be taught; 3) how it shall be
taught; and 4) who may be admitted to study.54
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke," the Court
restated the four academic freedoms and concluded: "It is the busi-
ness of the university to provide that atmosphere which is most con-
ducive to speculation, experiment and creation . . . an atmosphere
in which there prevails the four essential freedoms."' "6
E. Privilege and the Balancing Approach Taken By the Federal
Courts
The two fundamental interests at odds are the legitimate need
to prove the existence of discrimination and the need to protect aca-
demic freedom. These two competing interests create difficulty in the
privilege analysis.
Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage full
discovery of relevant, unprivileged information.5 ' This allows two
major objections to discovery: relevance and privilege.
50. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
51. Id. at 250.
52. Id. at 238. In 1951, New Hampshire passed a statute which had as its purpose the
regulation of subversive activities. Subversive organizations were declared unlawful. Subversive
persons were denied government employment. Those employed as teachers in public educa-
tional institutions were included in the ban. In 1953, the Legislature gave the attorney general
the right to direct full investigations of any subversive activity. Petitioner was summoned to
two such proceedings. Id.
53. Id. at 254.
54. Id. at 263.
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
56. Id. at 312.
57. FED. R. Civ. Pitoc. 26(b).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence originally proposed by the Advi-
sory Committee and approved by the Supreme Court recognized
nine defined privileges: required reports, attorney-client, psychother-
apist-patient, husband-wife, clergyman-communicant, political vote,
trade secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and iden-
tity of informer. 8 However, Congress rejected this attempt to make
the creation of new privileges impossible. 9 The Federal Rules of
Evidence, adopted by Congress, permitted the creation of new privi-
leges where applicable."
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that, except where pro-
vided by the Constitution or an Act of Congress or in Supreme
Court rules, the rules of privilege shall be governed by the common
law." It further provides that where elements of the claim or defense
are governed by state law, that privilege shall be determined in ac-
cordance with state law. 2
Therefore, California may implement state privilege law in ac-
cordance with current principles governing privilege. The principles
which currently govern privilege law are in large part derived from
elements established by Wigmore." Wigmore established four condi-
tions as necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of communications:
1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed, 2) the element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties, 3) the relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered, and
4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for correct disposal of litigation."
Both the federal courts and the California courts have refused to find
these conditions applicable to peer evaluations in order to support
the creation of a broad category of privileged communication in this
area. Rather, noting the importance of these factors, they have cho-
sen to look at the factors as they pertain to the particular facts sur-
rounding each individual case."
58. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 75.
59. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 75.
60. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 75.
61. FED. R. EviD. 501.
62. Id.
63. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2285.
64. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2285.
65. Zaustinsky v. University of California, 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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The leading cases in the federal courts have produced opposite
results. In In re Dinnan, the Fifth Circuit held no qualified privi-
lege exists to protect peer evaluation information from disclosure.6"
Asserting a qualified privilege to prevent the discovery of such infor-
mation, a review board committee member refused to answer deposi-
tion questions concerning his vote on plaintiff's application for pro-
motion."' The court held that the necessity of proving discrimination
outweighed the benefits of academic freedom."
This balancing process produced an opposite result in Gray v.
Board of Higher Education, City of New York, 9 the court found in
favor of protecting the confidentiality of the faculty peer review sys-
tem.70 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, but noted that where
a plaintiff has been provided with reasons for denial of tenure, the
scale tips in favor of instituting a privilege.7' However, absent such a
statement of reasons from the reviewing committee, the court ruled
that uninhibited discovery should prevail.7' The ruling should en-
courage limited disclosure by the university prior to a lawsuit.
A continuance of this ad hoc balancing process appears to be
the trend in the federal courts. Recent cases still weigh the plaintiff's
need for discovery against the university's need for confidentiality.73
The courts have continued to apply Wigmore's four conditions on an
ad hoc basis, as opposed to an abstract application creating a privi-
lege applicable to all peer evaluation cases.
California courts have failed to provide any clearer guidelines.
Its constant refusal to provide a bright line rule on the subject has
led to a patternless mixture of absolute privilege, partial discovery
and full discovery.
66. 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 432-33.
69. 92 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
70. Id. at 94.
71. Gray, 692 F.2d at 908.
72. Id.
73. Zaustinsky, 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The Zaustinsky court refused to cre-
ate an absolute privilege. However, the court stated that "materials in issue here are eligible
for treatment as privileged confidential communications." The court held that the question of
privilege must be determined on "a case-by-case adjudication 'in the light of reason and expe-
rience.' " Id. at 624 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46-48 (1980)).
(Vol. 28
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III. ANALYSIS
The peer evaluation system has become an area of major con-
cern to California courts. It is this confidentiality requirements of the
system, and not the process itself have come into question. A refusal
to order discovery could mean the end of a lawsuit, while an order to
allow such discovery could deter open discussion of a candidate's
qualifications, thereby weakening the factual basis of the peer evalu-
ator's decisions.
The Balancing Process in California
California courts have refused to create a privilege. 4 The deci-
sion to order disclosure is determined on a case by case basis. Conse-
quently, leading California cases offer no coherent principles which
could bind them together.
In King v. University of California,"8 it was held that the de-
nial of tenure does not deprive a professor of any significant property
or liberty interest in employment." In discussing appellant's liberty
interest, the court took the position that absent accusations of incom-
petence, no significant stigma is created simply by the denial of ten-
ure. 7 7 It held that the failure to achieve excellence is not equated
with incompetence.7 8 The court demanded a showing that appel-
lant's reputation was adversely affected in order for a liberty interest
to be violated. 9
After denying the due process claim, the court focused its atten-
tion on the disclosure issue. Appellant contended that it was unfair
to deny him access to his files and yet expect him to make a prima
74. See generally County of San Diego v. Superior County (Tri-City Hosp. Dist.), 176
Cal. App. 3d 1009, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1986); King, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189 Cal. Rptr.
189 (1982); Dong, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981);
75. 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1982). Appellant was hired as a lecturer
in 1973. In 1976 he was promoted to assistant professor. Between 1979 and 1980, appellant
was considered for tenure but tenure was not recommended. He petitioned the trial court for a
writ of mandate to compel the university to conduct a full adversary hearing and to disclose the
entire contents of his tenure file. The trial court denied the request and the court of appeal
affirmed. Id. at 815, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
76. Id. at 815, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 191. Appellant attempted to distinguish Roth, by stat-
ing Roth had been hired for only one year whereas appellant had been reappointed as assistant
professor and had been employed for a total of eight years. The court believed the distinction
to be without merit and added: "The issue has been extensively litigated. The unanimous
conclusion is that a non- tenured professor has no cognizable property interest in the renewal
of his employment." Id.
77. Id. at 816, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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facie case of discrimination in order to obtain a hearing.80 The court
rejected this contention.81
After taking all interests into consideration, the court refused to
order disclosure because the university's need to maintain confidenti-
ality outweighed any benefit that the plaintiff could derive from dis-
closure.82 In addition, the court believed the plaintiff's interest in dis-
closure of information was sufficiently protected by the university's
policy to provide each candidate with a summary of the information
contained in his or her personnel file. 83
The court in King, somewhat mistakenly relied upon the Board
of Trustees v. Superior Court (Dong).84 The King court erroneously
concluded that the discovery in Dong had been limited.85 However,
the Dong court released the plaintiff's file in its entirety, exempting
only the names of the evaluators.8
Although, the results were different in these two cases, the
courts followed similar analyses. In Dong, the court sought to recon-
cile a strong policy in favor of discovery with the inalienable right to
pursue and obtain privacy." The same policy consideration weighed
heavily on the minds of the court in King.
However, the remedies afforded the professor in King and those
afforded him in Dong were fundamentally different. In King, the
plaintiff received a university prepared synopsis of the contents of his
file and the court refused to order any further disclosure.88 In Dong,
the court ordered the university to provide plaintiff with an exact
duplication of the university's personnel files, absent only the iden-
tity of his evaluators. 89 The King court provided the university with
greater protection. Information prepared and made available by the
80. Id. at 818, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 819, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
83. Id. at 812, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
84. Dong, 119 Cal. ,App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981).
85. King, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
86. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
87. Id. at 533, 174 Cal. Rptr. 169. The court stated: "We accordingly hold that Dr.
Dong is entitled to discovery of his personnel file, subject to appropriate safeguarding of the
rights of privacy of those who had furnished information therein concerning his qualifications
for employment, promotion, additional compensation, or termination .. " Id.
88. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 191. The appellant requested a copy of
his personnel file. He received a summary provided for by university regulations. In addition,
the appellant filed an appeal with the standing committee on privilege and tenure. The com-
mittee concluded that no violation of university policy had occurred. Id.
89. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 533, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The court believed that Dr. Dong
was entitled to the discovery of his personnel file and that the only protection necessary to
safeguard the board members' right to privacy was the deletion of their names. Id.
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university allowed it to control its own procedures. Control of its
own processes is essential to academic freedom. Such control assures
review boards the secrecy necessary to perform their function in an
uninhibited manner.
The King court also relied on McKillop v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California.0 The McKillop court explicitly denied the
plaintiff's motion to compel production of documents."1 This is a
greater protective stance than that taken by the Dong court. If the
King court had wanted to fully endorse the Dong court's position, it
could have referred to that case exclusively. However, the court's re-
liance on McKillop indicated its intention to afford the university
greater confidentiality in its records.
Despite reliance on cases which create some type of privilege,
the California courts have refused to develop a privilege applicable
to state cases. They continue to rely upon the process of weighing
and balancing competing interests.
This continued use of the balancing test was most recently illus-
trated in County of San Diego v. Superior Court." The court re-
fused to grant plaintiff discovery of notes, transcripts or memoranda
of committee members evaluating a hospital's qualifications as a
trauma unit.'" After balancing the interests, the court concluded that
the public's interest in maintaining quality health care outweighed
any interest posed by the plaintiff.'4 However, the court refused to
find a privilege under any existing statute or code.' 5
IV. PROPOSAL
Currently, peer review committees are given no solid ground on
which to walk. Absent predictability, which could be provided by an
absolute communication privilege, it is difficult for committee mem-
bers to adequately anticipate the repercussions of their deliberation.
The most viable solution to this problem is the establishment of
an absolute communication privilege, protecting the relationship
among faculty evaluators. Several factors support such a conclusion.
First, an absolute communication privilege is supported by the anal-
90. McKillop, 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
91. Id. at 1281. Petitioner was denied tenure at the University of California Davis. She
requested the production of all papers, letters, forms, reports, and other documents included in
personnel files of the university. Id. at 1271.
92. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 222 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1986).
93. Id. at 1015, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1024, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
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ysis underlying the Wigmore factors. Second, the privilege will not
significantly harm litigants because the implementation of adequate
university procedures should provide adequate protection to the
plaintiff. Third, case analysis suggests that academic freedom protec-
tions should be extended to peer evaluation committees. Fourth,
courts have made various attempts to protect peer evaluation mate-
rial by constructing obstacles other than privilege."
A. Supporting an Absolute Communication Privilege: The Wig-
more Factors
The four Wigmore factors continue to play an essential role in
the creation of privilege. An analysis of these four factors supports
the creation of an absolute communication privilege.
First, a communication must "originate in confidence," if it is to
be afforded privilege.97 Communications that "originate in confi-
dence" are made with the assumption that they will be kept in confi-
dence. When faculty members serve on a peer evaluation board, they
serve with the assumption that their comments will be heard only by
those colleagues present at such deliberations. If this assumption was
not fundamental to the system, questions of discovery would never
surface.
This assumption is supported by university policy as most uni-
versities refuse to disclose the information contained in peer review
files. However, some universities have allowed disclosure limited to a
statement of the reasons for denial. 8
Second, such confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the parties' relationship. " This re-
quires: 1) that the peer evaluation system be found essential to aca-
demic excellence; and 2) that confidentiality is found essential to the
maintenance of the peer review committees.
Applying university standards is a matter of professional judg-
ment. 10 The universities of this country have chosen peer review
evaluations as a means of regulating the quality of their faculties. In
E.E.O.C. v. University of Notre Dame Du Lacl10 the court com-
mented on the peer review process: "It is clear that the peer review
process is essential to the very lifeblood and heartbeat of academic
96. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
97. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2285.
98. See King, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1982).
99. Id.
100. Johnson, 435 F. Supp. at 1346.
101. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
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excellence and plays a most vital role in the proper and efficient
functioning of our nation's colleges and universities.' '10 2
In order for these committees to accurately evaluate the abilities
of their colleagues, their members must provide a frank and unre-
strained critique. 8 Tenure decisions are highly subjective. Sponta-
neity encourages faculty members to voice their subjective concerns.
Confidentiality enhances free and spontaneous deliberation. Confi-
dentiality also ensures that a member speak with candor, free from
the fear that a subjective statement will later be misconstrued or
taken out of context. Confidentiality is essential to the maintenance
and the function of these committees.
A number of commentators believe that absent such confidenti-
ality, committee members will be reluctant to criticize. The destruc-
tion of such confidentiality would have a chilling effect on the entire
process, especially in smaller universities and departments where
personal friendships and close ties naturally inhibit criticism.10 4
Third, the relationship must be one which, in the opinion of the
community, ought to be sedulously fostered. 0 5 The guarantee of aca-
demic freedom is a reflection of society's desire to protect the quality
of academic life. Americans regard education as a key to a prosper-
ous future. The excellence of such education is the essence of its
value. The United States Supreme Court in Sweezy, when reflecting
upon the importance of education, commented: "Teachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die."'10 6
Fourth, Wigmore requires that injury to the relationship by dis-
closure of communications must be greater than the benefit gained
from the correct disposal of litigation.107 The harm which would in-
ure to the peer evaluation system could mean a failure of the entire
system. On the other hand, failure to compel discovery in certain
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality throughout the decision
making process. The court compared peer evaluation deliberations with both jury deliberations
and the decision making procedures of government agencies. The court stated: "Just as a lim-
ited executive privilege is necessary for the executive branch of our government to functionproperly, and as confidential judicial and jury deliberations are essential to preserve the integ-
rity of those processes, confidentiality is equally critical in faculty tenure selection pro-
cess. ... Id. at 336-37.
105. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2285.
106. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
107. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2285.
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situations may not signal the end of a lawsuit.
As the court in Dong suggested, requested material may often
be available through other sources.1 08 If a privilege is created, the
plaintiff would simply be forced to develop these other sources. Some
requests have no specific purpose. A plaintiff may request all obtain-
able information in hopes of finding some small piece of information,
possibly helpful, to his or her case. Some universities have responded
to the legitimate need for information by voluntarily providing lim-
ited data concerning the decision making process. These procedures
prevent overbroad requests for irrelevant information and yet pro-
vide plaintiffs with a source for information.
B. Supporting an Absolute Communication Privilege: University
Implemented Disclosure Procedures
If an absolute communication privilege were erected, any nega-
tive effects could be alleviated by the implementation of disclosure
procedures at the university level. The university could: 1) prepare a
list of reasons for plaintiff's denial of tenure; or 2) prepare a sum-
mary of the plaintiff's entire personnel file; or 3) release the file in
its entirety, deleting only the names of the reviewers.
Both federal and California courts have refused to order full
disclosure, when the university discloses the reasons for the denial of
tenure.109 The American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) supports this solution. The AAUP was founded in 1915
specifically to protect academic freedom.110 The purpose of the
AAUP, as expressed in its Constitution, is "to facilitate a more effec-
tive cooperation among teachers and research scholars ...[and] to
increase the usefulness and advance the standards, ideals and welfare
of the profession."'11 The AAUP focuses on the protection of both
the academic profession as a whole, and its individual members.
1
'
Gray explicitly adopted the standard set forth in the American
Association of University Professors brief." 8 The AAUP's standard
requires that: 1) an unsuccessful candidate for reappointment or ten-
108. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
109. See Gray, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); King, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 189 (1982).
110. AAUP, supra note 4, at ix.
111. 53 AAUP BULLETIN 243-45 (Summer 1967).
112. AAUP, supra note 4, at 3.
113. 692 F.2d at 907. The AAUP is an organization dedicated to teachers. It functions
like a labor union. It is not an organization dedicated to the university, rather its allegiance is
to the teaching community.
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ure receive a meaningful written statement of reasons from the peer
review committee; and 2) an unsuccessful candidate be afforded
proper intramural grievance procedures." 4 The AAUP proposed
that where such procedures are followed, the actual notes, memo-
randa and transcripts contained in the board's file should be consid-
ered privileged." 5
However, the court explicitly rejected complete privilege, and
felt that university controlled disclosure adequately met the court's
standard of fairness."' The autonomy and academic freedom of the
university is protected where the university controls its own disclo-
sure procedures.
Gray, King, and McKillop suggest the feasibility of making a
higher standard of protection available to universities. Although no
court requires these types of limited disclosure procedures, they en-
courage them. Universities which implement disclosure procedures
may better protect both their peer review boards and their faculty
members.
However, there are negative repercussions which may result
from the implementation of disclosure procedures. The most fatal of
these is the creation of an entitlement." 7 Such an entitlement could
create a property or liberty interest."' Property and liberty interests
are subject to a higher standard of protection under the due process
clause. However, the decision to furnish reasons for denial of tenure
is a far cry from instituting a right to reappointment." 9 Case law
has not suggested that these procedures create a legal right to
reappointment. 20
Increase in litigation is a secondary problem.' 2 ' However, it is
arguable that knowledge may prevent a misguided lawsuit from find-
ing its way into the courtroom.' 2 "An individual cut off from any
willingness to explain has only the recourse of filing suit as the one
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Van Alstyne, Furnishing Reasons for a Decision against Reappointment: Legal
Considerations, 53 AAUP BULLETIN 285-86 (Summer 1976). Professor William Van Alt-
styne is Perkins Professor of Law at Duke University. The comments being discussed were
offered in response to a question from an AAUP chapter about potential legal obligations
incurred in providing reasons for a decision not to reappoint. Id.
118. Id. at 285.
119. Id.
120. See Perry, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
121. Van Alstyne, supra note 117, at 286.
122. Van Alstyne, supra note 117, at 286.
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remaining means of compelling an explanation." '23
Universities which refuse to institute such procedures have
failed to address properly the concerns of their teaching staffs. Lim-
ited disclosure can prevent hostility and distrust. If a decision is
made behind closed doors, an aggrieved teacher is without a remedy.
A professor denied tenure is unable to obtain the information neces-
sary to adequately critique his or her performance. If a decision is
made for proper reasons, the university has little to fear. Limited
disclosure by the university prevents ill will and allows the professor
to learn from his or her mistakes.
It is -advantageous for the university to control its own disclo-
sure. Peer review evaluations are highly subjective and are not easily
amenable to judicial scrutiny.124 University control may prevent judi-
cial second guessing of tenure decisions.
Universities interested in a fair and just balance of these inter-
ests should adopt some type of disclosure procedures.. University pre-
pared synopses are fundamental to the adoption of a hands-off ap-
proach by the courts.
C. Supporting an Absolute Communication Privilege: Academic
Freedom
The courts have consistently indicated the importance of the
confidentiality of the content of peer review discussions to the guar-
antee of academic freedom. 12 The interests at stake have been dis-
cussed at length in other portions of this comment. Although there
has been no explicit United States Supreme Court decision which
directly addresses the protection of peer review evaluations, the prin-
ciples endorsed in Sweezy and Bakke form a presumption favoring
protection in this area. As stated by the Court in both cases, the
concerns over academic freedom are,. in part, satisfied when a univer-
sity may determine for itself "who may teach.""2 6 Although neither
case specifically addressed this issue, the Court found it appropriate
to include "who may teach" as an element of academic freedom.
"Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always be free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; oth-
123. Van Alstyne, supra note 117, at 286.
124. Sweeney, 569 F.2d at 176.
125. See generally E.E.O.C. v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th
Cir. 1983).
126. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
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erwise our civilization will stagnate and die.' 127 An atmosphere of
distrust and suspicion can be no greater than where one believes his
or her confidences about a colleague may be disclosed.
The interests justifying an academic freedom privilege in Sweezy
are applicable to a finding of academic privilege in the field of peer
review evaluations. The Court stated that university life must be free
from inhibition and stagnation. These concerns are applicable to all
academic situations. The depth and importance of these interests was
expressed in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 8 where the Court de-
clared: "The vigilant protection of Constitutional freedoms is no-
where more vital than in the community of American schools.' 2 9
The concerns expressed and protections instituted are equally
applicable to all phases of the educational process. The contents of a
course or a lecture should not be more protected than those delibera-
tions concerning who may teach the course.1 80 The process of select-
ing students should not be more protected than the process of select-
ing faculty.' 8 '
D. Supporting an Absolute Communication Privilege:Judicial At-
tempts to Protect the Peer Evaluation System
Both federal and state courts sought to provide the confidential-
ity required by the peer evaluation system.' One of these tech-
niques is the continued refusal to order full disclosure when a uni-
versity has already provided some type of disclosure.' But the
courts have effectively prevented disclosure by requiring plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination prior to
disclosure.'
In Zaustinsky v. University of California,' the court applied
Wigmore's four conditions.' In applying the fourth condition re-
garding injury versus benefit, the court required the plaintiff, at
127. Id. at 250.
128. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
129. Id. at 603.
130. The Court protected such reference in Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
131. The Court protected such affirmative action procedures in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
132. See generally Gray, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); King, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1982). -
133. See generally Gray, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); King, 138 Cal. App. 3d 812, 189
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1982).
134. See Lynn, 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
135. 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
136. Id. at 624-25.
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some stage, establish a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion. 87 Absent such a showing, injury resulting from disclosure is
greater than the benefit obtained from such disclosure.
In establishing a prima facie employment discrimination case,
the plaintiff must show:
(1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking ap-
plicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(4) that after his rejection the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applications from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications.188
Given the particularly subjective nature of these decisions,
showing the existence of these four elements could be difficult. The
plaintiff must meet this burden prior to the issuance of any discovery
order.'" 9
These hurdles increase the plaintiff's burden. -Such actions by
the courts suggest their slant in favor of university confidentiality. If
courts did not believe that the interests and arguments of the univer-
sity were meritorious, they would refuse to place any obstacles in the
way of free and open discovery. Their refusal to allow these interests
to be overshadowed indicates a willingness to offer further protec-
tions to the peer evaluating system.
As the litigation in this area increases, it will become more diffi-
cult for courts to side-step the issue. Universities will demand an
answer which stands on solid ground. Those serving on peer review
boards will demand confidentiality. Where such confidentiality can-
not be promised, silence will prevail. Where silence prevails, debate
and criticism is lost. Where debate and criticism are silenced, aca-
demic excellence is forever in jeopardy.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment traced a problem currently faced by universities
and colleges nationwide. Universities are haled into court by plain-
tiffs demanding the full and complete disclosure of peer review eval-
uations which, until recently, were held confidential. The result of
this litigation has been a mass of contradiction. Neither plaintiff nor
defendant can predict the outcome of a discovery request in this area.
Peer evaluation committees have as their task the selection of
137. Id. at 625.
138. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
139. Id.
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applicants for available tenure positions. The peer review process
has been referred to as the "lifeblood and heartbeat of academic ex-
cellence." ' Academic excellence is a cherished part of American
life. Confidentiality is a necessary element for these committees to
effectively function because it facilitates free and open debate. Where
a committee member is faced with the threat that his or her com-
ments may be made public such debate may be stifled.
The concerns of the university conflict with those of the tenure
applicant. Traditionally, courts have sought to encourage free and
open discovery. The uninhibited search for the truth has been the
primary function of both the criminal and civil courts of this coun-
try. "" The plaintiff's need for full discovery is at its greatest where
he or she alleges discrimination because equal opportunity has tradi-
tionally received stringent statutory and constitutional protection.
Only where a relationship is fundamentally important to society
will the law of privilege protect values other than the search for
truth. Universities nationwide have sought the protection provided
by privilege in an attempt to protect the confidentiality of peer re-
view evaluations.
The response by both federal and California courts is to deter-
mine each case on its own facts. The courts have chosen to use a
balancing approach in determining the outcome of the particular liti-
gation. The interests of the university are weighed and balanced
against those of the plaintiff. Ad hoc determination, rather than a
concrete line, has led to confusion.
An absolute communication privilege would alleviate the confu-
sion. Peer evaluation boards could function properly and efficiently,
free from the fear of discovery orders. The proper functioning of
these boards is essential to academic excellence.
A number of reasons support the creation of an absolute com-
munication privilege protecting the content of the deliberation pro-
cess undertaken by a peer review committee. But perhaps the call for
an absolute communication privilege in this area can no better be
supported than by the words of Chief Justice Warren:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American uni-
versities is almost self-evident. No one should under estimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
140. E.E.O.C., 715 F.2d at 336.
141. See Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 427.
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and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intel-
lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation."'
Kimberly S. Paul
142. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. Although Sweezy is not factually on point, the concerns
expressed by the United States Supreme Court reflect the concerns of this comment. Chief
Justice Warren was speaking in the context of subversive activity, yet he was speaking to a
much broader concern. He spoke of protections not for the individual but of protections which
are the very foundation of our educational system.
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